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ABSTRACT: Rising oil imports have spawned a variety of policies for increasing
energy security. We provi de pol icy makers wi th aqua1Hative compari son of
these policies using a dynamic optimal control model. By explicitly modeling
long-term adjustment we capture the differences between immediate and long-term
implications of the policies. Thirty year price and output paths for OPEC and
the United States are simulated assuming that U.S. producers are competitive and
OPEC is a dominant firm. We find that the policies have quite different effects
on imports and welfare. The tariff reduces imports most, followed by the
gasoline tax. The subsidy barely makes a dent in imports. However, U.S.
monopsony power in the world oil market renders the subsidy welfare enhancing,
whereas a per-unit tariff and gasoline tax are costly for the United States. An
ad-valorem tariff on the other hand, both lowers imports and enhances U. S.
welfare.The crisis in the Middle East has renewed concern over dependence on
foreign oil supplies and the United States' vulnerabil ity to oil supply
disruptions. Although low oil prices before the crisis benefitted consumers and
the downstream refining industry, they wrought havoc with high cost domestic
•
producers and their support industries. The resulting fall in domestic
production' and increase in imports are projected to continue, causing concern
over dependence on foreign oil supplies. These trends have renewed suggestions
to protect the domestic oil market or reduce domestic consumption. 2
Environmental concerns also reinforce the calls to reduce domestic consumption.
In this paper we will compare three of these suggestions - an oil import fee,
increased gasoline taxes, and subsidies to domestic oil and gas producers.
Protectionist policies are appealing on a number of grounds. A buyer of
oil as large as the United States can exercise monopsony power through taxation
and shift the tax onto foreign oil suppliers. Tariffs and taxes would reduce the
federal deficit while policies which increase domestic production would lower
'us oil production (8971 thousand bid in 1985 and 7385 thousand bid in
1991) is projected to fall further to 7150 mbld in 1992. Crude oil imports
(3201 thousand bid in 1985 and 5780 thousand bid in 1991) are projected to
increase further to 6130 in 1992. Sources: American Petroleum Institute,
8asic Petroleum Data Book, 1986 &Oil and Gas Journal, 1-27-92:52,58.
2For example, President Bush in his first campaign suggested subsidies to
domestic producers. Representative Dan Rostenkowski recommended a 10-15 cent
per gallon increase in the current 9 cent excise tax on gasoline. Oil and Gas
Journal 12/12/88:3. Alan Greenspan argued that "... a gasoline tax would do
'less harm' than other levies." Wall Street Journal, 2/3/89:2. Salomon
Brothers saw three energy tax options: a gasoline tax, an oil import fee, or
a BTU tax. Oil and Gas Journal, 7/30/90:38. There were several tax incentives
for domestic exploration and production in the 1990 Revenue Reconciliation




imports and soften the macroeconomic effects of a disruption in foreign oil
supply.
A number of earlier studies have considered various protectionists
policies.3 Since production today may mean less production in the future, we
analyze protectioni st pol icies using long term dynami c anal ysis. Exampl es of
dynamic analyses of these issues has included both analytical work and
simulations. Bergstrom (1982) considered the revenue aspects of an oil tariff
by analytically working out the static and dynamic optimal oil tariff in an
n-country pure trade Nash equilibrium model with total oil supplies fixed and
costlessly extracted or extracted at constant marginal cost. He concluded that
the optimal tariff might be on the order of $10.50 to $21 per barrel.
Walls (1991) econometrically developed a U.S. supply model assuming U.S.
dynamic optimization and used it to analyze regional effects of a tariff assuming
oil prices are set in world markets and that the tariff will be totally passed
on to U.S. consumers.
Dynamic analysis with endogenous oil prices and cost increasing as reserves
are depleted can not be solved analytically. Thus, Nesbitt and Choi (1988) using
the DFI World Oil Model dynamically simulated a U.S. tariff over a 60 year time
3Static analysis includes Broadman (1986), who argues for a domestic oil
premium but finds a wide range of suggested values depending on the
assumptions made about the market. Broadman and Hogan (1988), who include a
security component and macroeconomi c effects, fi nd an optirna1 tariff around
$10 per barrel. Bizer and Stewart (1987), using a small general equil ibrium
open economy model, conclude that a tax on labor income dominates both an oil
consumption tax and a tariff in terms of the dollar cost of additional
revenue. The tariff is particularly costly, especially if the rest of the
world retaliates. Schmidt and Dunstan (1985) using the MIT-Penn-SSRC economic
model find that a $5.00 tariff would be shifted to final consumers and would
generate higher inflation and unemployment than an equal revenue income tax.
Uri and Boyd (1989) examine a U.S. gasol ine tax using a computable general
equilibrium model. Dahl and YUcel (1992) contains a literature review of
papers that consider the macroeconomic effects of protectionist policies.
3horizon. In their model, with seven supply and five demand regions, OPEC is
divided into the core cartel and the competitive fringe. Oil resources are a
function of future additions to proved reserves and backstop fuels are $60 per
barrel. They concluded that OPEC absorbs only a small share of a $10.50 per
barrel tariff and found large losses in net economic welfare.
We extend the above dynamic work by focusing on not one but a comparison
of three policies - an oil tariff, a gasoline tax, and a producer subsidy that
have comparabl e revenue effects ina consistent dynami c framework wi th endogenous
oil prices. The effects of our policies will depend on the costs of both OPEC
and domestic producers, which are rather dissimilar and will change as reserves
are depleted. Since explicit inclusion of these costs renders an analytical
model solution unobtainable, we abandon the analytical attractiveness of
Bergstrom (1982) in favor of the more computationally complex dynamic optimal
control model.
We present this model in section II of our paper followed by base case
model inputs in section III. The results of the base case simulations are
presented in section IV of the paper followed by the sensitivity test results in
section V. Conclusions are summed up in section VI.
II. Model
Given the concentration of reserves in OPEC countries and in the interest
of keeping the model reproducible and relatively transparent, we focus our
analysis on OPEC and u.S. domestic producers. Our choice of market structure is
based on work by Griffin (1985) that favors a market sharing cartel model for
OPEC but a competitive model for non-OPEC producers. We assume that OPEC is a






non-OPEC U.S. imports. Domestic producers are profit maximizing price takers on
the U.S. crude oil market while non-OPEC oil suppliers export a constant amount
to the Uni ted States. Both the Uni ted States and OPEC own oil reserves and
maximize their profits over a given time horizon T. We simulate the problem for
a base case as well ~s a gasoline tax of 6, a per-unit oil tariff of T, and a
per-unit subsidy to U.S. producers of o. The tariff and subsidy are chosen such
that their revenues or costs are equal to the gasoline tax revenues. The general
maximization problem for the United States is to choose the production path of
Qu that maximizes:
fT [P - f36 + 0 - CU(Ru)]Qu e"t o
subject to the constraint
Ru = -Qu (Ib)
while OPEC chooses the production path for Qo that maximizes or [f(Qu,Qo) - T - f36 - Co(Ro)]Qo e'rt (2a)
subject to
Ro = -Qo. (2b)
In the above expressions, P is the price of oil, f3 is the percent of the barrel
going to gasoline, f is the inverted demand function for domestic and OPEC oil
by U. S. consumers, Qo is OPEC production goi ng to U. S. markets, Qu is U.S.
domestic production, Ru and Ro are reserve levels, r is the real interest rate,
and Cu and Co are costs of production. For both OPEC and the U.S., costs
increase as reserves are depleted, i.e., C R < O.
The Hamiltonian for the United States is
•
H = [P -f36 + 0 - Cu]Qu e-rt + Pu(-Qu)
The first order conditions are
H QU = [(P - f36 + 0) - Cu]e'rt - Pu = 0
5
(3)
(4)Similarly, for OPEC we have
H = [f(Qu,Qo) -T - (36 - Co]Oo e-
r
' + Po(-Qo)
H ao = [(faoOo + f) -T - {36 -Co]e-
r
, - Po = 0





The solutions to the maximization problem above will need to satisfy the
constraints (lb), (2b) and the optimality conditions (4), (5), (7) and (8).
Since an analytical solution is not possible,' we solve the first order
conditions for price and output paths numerically using Miele's (1970,1974)
highly efficient Modified Quasilinearization Algorithm. After solving the system
for price, U. S. output, and OPEC production sent to the Un ited States we
calculate deadweight losses and/or gains in welfare given by the change in
consumer plus producer surplus, net of tax revenues or subsidies. Inputs for
these solutions are developed in the next section.
III. BASE CASE MODEL INPUTS
We develop U.S. demand for domestic and OPEC oil by starting with total
U.S. demand for oil products:
Ot = Ou + 00 t On t OP
, We can manipulate the first order conditions for the U.S. to see how
the gasoline tax and the subsidy will affect prices. From the first order
conditions we have
p= rp-rc-r{36tPO.
This equation impl ies that the gasol ine tax causes the price to rise slower
than the base case and the subsidy causes the price to rise faster than in the
base case. Resource use is curtailed by the gasoline tax and so is the growth
in prices. Similarly, the subsidy increases resource use, leading to higher
costs of production and a faster rise in prices. Although the tariff does not
enter the domestic producer's objective function exp1icit1y, it increases




Where Qt = the total demand for oil products in the United States. Qu, Qo, Qn,
and Qp are the demand for products satisfied by domestic oil, OPEC oil, non-
OPEC/non-U.S. oil, and net product imports, respectively. For the constant
elasticity of demand case Qt is the following function of demand price Pd and
income Y:
Since consumer welfare depends on the demand for oil products, we must
first relate this demand to the derived demand for domestic and OPEC oil which
is an input into our simulation model. Product imports are assumed to be the
same percent of total U.S. demand as in 19875 and product demand price, Pd, is
assumed to be the same percent of product supply price, Ps. Under these
assumptions, U.S. demand for crude oil as a function of supply price of oil is:
Qu + Qo + Qn = 0 (PS)B Y'
Inverting gives the supply price as a function of U.S. and OPEC production as:
Ps = [(1/0)(Qu+Qo+Qn) ]lIB Y·'/B
To simplify the analysis and focus on the United States and OPEC we assume
in the base case that imports from non OPEC producers remain constant at 842.785
million barrels per year (imports from non·OPEC producers are referred to as non-
OPEC supply hereafter).6
From a literature search, we choose base case price and income elasticities
5product imports are needed to balance demands in various product markets
and we assume this need for balance will continue. Current trends suggest that
expectations of 1arge OPEC product imports wi 11 not materialize as these
products have tended to find other markets.
6 We would expect this to be an upper bound on non-OPEC imports since
industry expectations are that non-Opec oil in the comi ng decade wi 11 most
likely continue the decline it began in the late 1980s. Oil and Gas Journal,
4/29/91:75.
7of -.9 and .8, which are normalized around 1987 variable values 9ivin9 an in-
verted demand function of: 7
P = 136.83 (Qu + Qo + Qnr1.1y.89
On the supply side of the market, we take cost and reserve estimates from
Dahl (1991a) and (1991b).8 U.S. total reserves are assumed to be 100.6 billion
barrels and costs as a function of remaining reserves (Ru) and a time trend (T)
are:
Cu = 33.13 - .2832 R u + .21 T
OPEC reserves are assumed to be 769.290 billion barrels and OPEC landed
costs in the United States as a function of remaining reserves R o and a time
trend are:
Co = 23.232 - .026 R o + .016 T
Since we have abstracted from demand for the rest of the world, we assume
7For surveys of these elasticities see Bohi (1981), Bohi and Zimmerman
(1984), and Dahl (1986). Many of the derived estimates for product price
elasticity are between -.3 and -1.6, while many of those for income elasticity
are between .6 and 1.4. In econometric work and simulations, our chosen long-
run elasticities of -0.9 and 0.8 were found to fit U.S. data well for 1955-
1973 and 1986-1990. In econometric equations on oil product demand per
capita, the price of oil, the price of natural gas, the price of coal, income
per capita, and these long-run elasticities, the equation explained 94% of the
variation in oil product demand. They did not perform well for the years
1974-1985 which saw dramatic price increases and two rather severe recessions.
For these years, a higher price and a lower income elasticity performed
better. (Data was taken from various issues of the IMF's International
Fi nancia1 Statistics, Energy statistics, and Energy balances.) These
elasticities are normal ized around 1987 product demand minus net product
imports of 5.624 billion barrels, GDP of $4.461 trillion, and an oil supply
price of $16.35
8Because proven reserve estimates in the United States appear to be
developed reserves, while those for OPEC appear to be much higher, US reserves
are taken to be proven reserves plus reserve additions plus an estimate for




•has recei ved between 6 and 20% of OPEC




the United States gets the same share of OPEC reserves as in 1987 or IS%.
9
Finally, we assume income grows at 2.S% per year, the real interest rate is 8%
and the time horizon is 30 years.
We first simulate optimal time paths for U.S. production, OPEC production,
and oil prices for a base case wi th no tariff or subsidy, and the current
gasol ine tax (0, a, and r = 0). We then simul ate the three pol icies: a
$.2S/gallon gasoline tax (equal to $10.S0 per 42 gallon barrel of gasoline or
roughly equal to $S.2S/barrel of crude oil with the current U.S. product miX);
an equal revenue tariff of $8.S9 per barrel; and a subsidy of $S.IS/barrel that
costs the same amount as the revenue the other two policies would generate.
10
IV . RESULTS
Base Case We find that initial simulated oil price is $13.10 in 1987, rising an
average of 6.1 percent per year to $31.47 by 2017. Simulated U.S. production,
which is somewhat higher than actual U.S. production, declines quite steeply for
20 years, and then rises very moderately until the end of the time horizon.
Domestic production begins at SI percent of total demand and falls to 40 percent
of demand over the 30 year simulation period, while simulated OPEC production,
which is somewhat lower than actual OPEC production in 1987, is more stable, with
a flatter convex shape. Increases in demand lead to increased production in the
9Since 1960 the United States
production, with an average of 12%.
that this share will rise.
10All revenues are measured in discounted present value with a discount
rate of 8%. The tariff and subsidy rate that had equal revenues or costs with
the gasoline tax were found by a grid search.
9later years for both groups of producers.'l By the end of the time horizon 28
percent of U.S. and 40 percent of OPEC's reserves remain.
The three policies produce rather different price and output paths, which
are given in Figures 1 and 2. For improved resolution, they are expressed as a
percent of the base case.
Gasoline Tax A 25 cent per gallon gasol ine tax lowers producer prices and
increases domestic consumer prices. The tax decreases oil imports by lowering
oil consumption, but it is a costly way of achieving this end.
The gasol ine tax reduces domestic consumption and production of oil as well
as imports by increasing consumer prices and decreasing producer prices. A
higher proportion of the tax is borne by consumers with an initial consumer price
increase of 20.8 percent, while producer prices decrease 4.8 percent. This
policy produces the highest initial consumer prices, but they fall below tariff
prices after the sixth year. Although domestic output is lowest wi th the
gasoline tax, the fall in consumption is much greater, leading to a decrease in
imports. Cumulative imports are reduced 10.5 percent over the 3D-year time
horizon.
The gasoline tax is a costly method of lowering imports and our dependence
on foreign oil. The present value of U.S. profits are decreased 13.4 percent
with the loss in consumer surplus almost twice the tax revenues collected. The
total deadweight loss over the entire 30 year time horizon, after netting out tax
revenues, is 89 cents per dollar of revenue generated. Although foreign
suppliers of oil bear some of the burden of the tax, the gasoline tax is the most




welfare costly of the three policies, at a cost of $17.71 per barrel of reduction
in imports. Figure 3 shows the level of imports to the United States under the
three policies.
Tariff The tariff benefits domestic oil producers and hurts-domestic consumers
by increasing domestic oil prices by almost 15% over the base case in 1987. By
increasing domestic oil prices, the tariff increases domestic oil production and
lowers domestic oil consumption and thus lowers imports. At the same time, the
United States is a large enough consumer of oil to have some monopsony power in
the oil market and as a result world oil prices fall roughly 5 percent over the
simulation period.
The tariff is the most successful policy in decreasing imports because it
attacks the problem both from the production and consumption ends. By increasing
domestic production and lowering consumption, the tariff decreases imports from
48 percent to 18 percent of consumption initially. Higher domestic production
with the tariff levels off in the later years and, while still below base case
levels, imports rise to 54 percent of total consumption. Over the entire time
horizon, imports are decreased 27.8 percent with the tariff.
The per-unit tariff is costly for the United States. Although the
discounted present value of domestic producer profits increase by 41 percent,
these gains and the tax revenues are not enough to compensate for the total loss
in consumers' surplus. The deadweight loss from the tariff is 175 percent of
tariff revenues. The reduction of a barrel of imports with the tariff is much
less than with the gasoline tax and costs the United States $2.82.
Subsidy The subsidy benefits both consumers and domestic producers of oil. Of
11the three policies, U.S. consumer prices are lowest and U.S. producer prices are
highest with the sUbsidy. Although the subsidy turns out to be welfare enhancing
for the United States, its affect on imports is minimal.
A per-unit subsidy of $5.15 increases U.S. production, backs out some
imports and lowers world prices. Both the increase in domestic production and
the United States' monopsony power in the oil market contribute to the decrease
in U.S. consumer prices. Although imports initially decrease, in the longer run,
increased consumption and production lead to a qUicker depletion of the U.S.
resource base, and imports rise towards base case 1evelsin the long run.
Overall, the subsidy decreases cumulative imports by only 1.2 percent.
The subsidy is welfare enhancing for the United States. The present value
of producer profits over the 30-year time horizon increase 56 percent with the
per-unit subsidy. The gain in consumer surplus is 150 percent over the base
case. After netting out the cost, the subsidy still remains beneficial to the
United States as a result of U.S. monopsony power in the world oil market.
12
V. SENSITIVITY TESTING
Numerous sensitivity tests were conducted for each pol icy. In the interest
of clarity and brevity, we only discuss interesting implications from the
sensitivity analysis, done across various specifications and parameters.
13 The
12The subsidy is welfare improving following the Ka1dor-Hicks rule: the
subsidy has positive net benefits because the gainers cou1 d compensate the
losers and still be better off.
13The fo11 owi ng sensit ivity tests were performed. Comp1ete results of
all simulations are available upon request from the authors.
I. Alinear demand function; 2. Price elasticities ranging from -.7 to -1.1;
3. No GNP growth; 4. OPEC with a di scount rate of 5%; 5. OPEC wi th a
discount rate of 10%; 6. Non-OPEC production declining by 10 %per year;
7. Non-OPEC production a constant proportion of OPEC supply calibrated to the






different demand specifications and different discount rates produce no
qual itative differences in the welfare results and ordering of pol icies.
Discount rate changes make no qualitative differences in welfare or the
ordering of the policies either. However, by changing cost functions as well as
intertemporal opportunity costs, they change the timing of price and output.
Conceivably, OPEC countries could have a lower social discount rate than private
domestic firms. When we lower OPEC's discount rate to 5 percent, costs fall and
OPEC's production is increased throughout the time horizon. However, there is
an intertemporal effect as well, which shifts OPEC's production profile towards
the future. With OPEC production shifted toward the future. U.S. production is
initially higher than the base case but quickly resumes its decline. The United
States produces less in this case over the entire time period.
On the other hand, Adel man (1986) argues that OPEC countries are very
dependent on an unstable oil market and therefore should have a higher interest
rate than oil companies. We model this contingency by increasing OPEC's discount
rate to 10 percent.
With a higher discount rate, OPEC costs increase, reducing output in all
periods. By shifting production to the present, the intertempora1 effect
counters the cost effect in the present and reinforces it in the future. The
overall effect of an increase in the discount rate is to shift OPEC production
to the present, increasing current production and reducing future production.
Since OPEC is shifting production to the present, U.S. producers shift to the
future. Although U.S. production is less than the base case for the first five
years, it is greater than the base case for the rest of the time horizon. U.S.
production is up 4.7 percent with respect to the base case at the end of the
thirty year time horizon.
13The base case assumed constant non-OPEC supply, whi ch is by no means
certain. Therefore, we have also experimented with non-OPEC supply as a fixed
percentage of OPEC supply and non-OPEC supply declining through time. When non-
OPEC supply is a constant percentage of OPEC supply, there are no qualitative
differences from the base case, but OPEC's reactions to the pol icies are
amplified.
A declining non-OPEC supply increases OPEC's market share, lowers the
elasticity of demand facing OPEC, and raises prices. Interestingly, there is no
tariff rate with equal revenues to a $0.25 per gallon gasoline tax when non-OPEC
supply is decl ining. The imposition of a tariff reduces OPEC production
drastically and maximum tariff revenues are lower than revenues from the gaso1ine
tax.
Another interesting result is that an ad-valorem tariff, at low rates, is
welfare enhancing for the United States. An ad-valorem tariff mimics a tax on
OPEC rents. OPEC's extraction costs are very low and quite stable, hence the
rate of increase in OPEC prices is relatively close to the interest rate. The
ad-va1orem tariff, based on OPEC prices, also rises at a rate close to the
interest rate and consequently is simil ar to a tax on OPEC rents. OPEC's
production is not altered significantly, and the United States reaps the rent.
The ad-valorem tariff is welfare enhancing for the United States up to 30 percent
of price. However, tariff revenues are not equal to the revenues from a $0.25
per gallon gasoline tax because maximum ad-valorem tariff revenues are only 81
percent of the gasoline-tax revenues.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS








gasoline tax, an oil tariff and a producer subsidy -would have rather different
effects on U.S. oil prices, imports, and production and consumption patterns.
Therefore, support for these policies will vary across interest groups. Those
most concerned about oil security as measured by total imports would favor a
tariff. It has by far the most significant effect in reducing imports. The
tariff is trailed by the gaso1ine tax, but with 1ess than half the tariff's
reduction in imports. The subsidy lowers imports the least, by a cumulative 1.2
percent.
U.S. producers would favor the subsidy with its high prices and high
production profile. They would favor the tariff somewhat less, and would be
opposed to a gasoline tax which lowers producers prices and profits. U.S.
consumers, looking at the direct effects, shouldn't see too much difference in
cost between a gasoline tax and a tariff. Both reduce welfare, although the
tariff lowers consumers' surplus somewhat more. Consumers would clearly prefer
the subsidy, which increases their welfare.
From an environmental perspective, the tariff would dominate since it
curtails U.S. consumption the most over the simulation period. Consumption is
reduced 27.8 percent with the tariff and 10.5 percent with the gasoline tax. The
subsidy, on the other hand, increases consumption by 7.9 percent.
These simulated prices and output paths have interesting welfare
implications. The social planner would find the gasoline tax the most costly
followed by the per-unit tariff. Surprisingly, both a subsidy and an ad-valorem
tariff are found to be welfare enhancing under the conditions in our model, with
import reduction highest with the tariff. Hence, if the underlying parameter
assumptions hold - OPEC a dynamically optimizing dominant firm, the United States
a dynamically optimizing competitive firm, and the United States having some
15monopsony power in the world oil market - an ad-valorem tariff could be the best
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